COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. V. No. 7.] *London, Saturday, 18th February,* 1804. [Price 10D

"I may be blamed at such an awful crisis for speaking so plainly; but plain dealing is now the only "method to recover public credit.—Paper is only a good thing while we have means of converting "it into cash. We shall not long be able, after the inundation of paper to which this system gives "birth, to stop Ministers from making Bank Notes a legal tender, and then adieu to the appearance "of specie at the Bank, and soon afterwards to the real value of the Bank Note..... It may "be said, that, in the present state of the country, it is wrong to lay before the Public so dark a "statement. I say, Sir, nothing is wrong that is true; *no evil is so great as concealment. I must oppose "this system of delusion that has so long been practised upon the country.*"——*Mr. Sheridan's Speech, March* 1, 1797. *See* POLITICAL PROTEUS, p. 325 and 328.

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ON VOLUNTEERS.

Extracted from Observations on the present State of Ireland, by Lord Sheffield; published January, 1785.

Page 360. It is now necessary to go back to the year 1778, to take notice of a phenomenon which began to appear about that time. The like never has been observed in any country, at least where there was an established government. To describe it strictly, it may be called an army unauthorised by the laws, and uncontrouled by the government of the country; but it was generally known by the name of "Volunteers of Ireland." Their constitution bore some semblance of a connexion with the executive power; and arms, belonging to the state, and stored under the care of the lieutenants of counties, were delivered to them upon the alarm of foreign invasion. So far, therefore, they seemed to be countenanced by government; but in a short time they caused no little jealousy and uneasiness. The arms issued from the public stores were insufficient to supply the rapid increase of the volunteers. The rest, together with the necessary accoutrements, and a considerable number of field pieces, were procured by themselves. It answered the purpose of opposition in both countries to speak highly of them, and the supporters of government in both countries mentioned them with civility, &c. &c. &c.

Page 362. Under these circumstances the volunteers, preserving, for a time, a degree of reserve and decency, kept at a certain distance, but were never entirely out of sight. They had been serviceable in supporting the civil magistrate; fewer castles, houses, or lands, were kept by forcible possession; and sheriffs were enabled to do their duty, &c. &c. &c.

But the many-headed monster soon began to think it would be proper to reform the state, and to purge the Parliament of Ireland. The several corps sent delegates, who sometimes appeared to be the delegates of counties. They formed a Parliament of their own; they resolved what they pleased, and, of course, that the other Parliament was a bad one. So far every thing went on as might be expected, &c. &c. &c.

Page 370. The good order which at first prevailed in these corps, is not less extraordinary than their rise and progress; *but it is to be imputed to the good disposition of the generality of the members, not to the nature of their constitution. It seems miraculous that no mischief has yet happened.* The mildness of government, and the good temper of the army, have done their part. None more likely, however, to be misled, *than men collected as they have been, conceiving a high opinion of their consequence and strength.* They are liable to be perverted, and turned to the worst purposes; and in almost every instance of the kind it has proved so. *Well meaning men, who may at one time be at their head, may, at other times, find themselves without authority, and at length be obliged to give way to those whose business is to inflame and pervert.* The young and active, and those who are not in the habit of thinking, will be led from one deviation to another, till at last they are advanced too far to go back; and some, otherwise respectable men, who have something to lose and little to gain, will repent of their attempts, to assist themselves at elections by volunteering, or through the medium of an affected good will towards reform. All that is hinted at may not happen; yet most assuredly, some of the politicians of Ireland are playing with most dangerous two-edged weapons. Such measures do not become them: such are the ladders on which the otherwise insignificant and vicious members of society, or men of desperate situations, mount, and with contempt look down on the miserable tools, through whose folly they were enabled to ascend, &c. &c. &c.

Page 374. *However unpleasant, these are*

matters highly proper, as well as necessary, to be stated; and he who endeavours to unfold the fatal consequences of measures, the outside of which may appear fair, is the real friend to a country.

TO THE EDITOR.

SIR,——So many instances of the misconduct of the volunteers, have been recorded of late in your Register, that I did not think it necessary, to add to the disgraceful list, by giving you an account of the proceedings of the Ewell corps. I vainly hoped it would have passed off, without attracting the public notice; but, there having appeared in your Register of the 4th inst. a letter signed C. S., I must take the liberty, in justice to my neighbours, to point out to you some inaccuracy in that statement. However highly reprehensible the conduct of the men has on some occasion been, yet, it is not just that a larger portion of obloquy should be thrown on them than they really deserve. In doing this, I must not be considered as defending the system; it is a system, which I deprecate as strongly as you can do; it is a system, which I am persuaded, if not speedily and radically amended, will be productive of evils to this country, more tremendous than I dare to think of. The tenour of the letter I allude to, undoubtedly tends to convey to those unacquainted with the corps, an idea, that it is an extremely disaffected one; nothing less can be inferred from it. It is to obviate that impression alone, that must apologize for my intruding on you. The letter asserts, that the oath of allegiance was *generally*, if not *wholly*, refused, when it was tendered to them. This I positively and most unequivocally deny. The oath was taken by every individual in the corps. It was the *repetition* of that oath, containing the additional words "heirs and "successors" which was objected to. Having taken one oath, they considered a second unnecessary, and thought it a reflection on their honour, that their loyalty to the King's heirs should be doubted; and, most absurdly supposed, that it was a deception; and, that it was intended to trick them into a something, they knew not what. All arguments to convince them to the contrary were then useless. At the same time they refused to sign the regulations, which were then offered them, under the same idea. These regulations were merely intended to promote the discipline of the corps, without binding them to any thing more. On this some degree of commotion ensued, which was quieted by postponing the consideration of the matter to a future day. On the day appointed to pay them the twenty shillings allowed them by government for drill days, the regulations were again offered for signing. Thirty-eight put their hands, the rest persisted in refusing it, and *eighteen*, mark, *only eighteen*, threw up their clothes, with much insolence; not into the house of the person alluded to, but at the Bull Head Inn, where the committee was then sitting. Some of the seceders, I cannot say how many, for I myself saw only two, stuck a bit of blue ribband in their hats, but I was not a witness of any parading, or other marks of triumph.—All this was certainly extremely improper, and highly reprehensible, but it must not be placed to the account of disaffection; it originated in another cause, and which is notorious to every inhabitant of Ewell. An unfortunate prejudice prevailed against the gentleman who was proposed for their captain. He had been a captain in the service of the East India Company, and it was supposed by the men, that the rigour necessary to regulate a ship's company, would influence his conduct in the command of the corps. He was, however, appointed, notwithstanding strong symptoms of aversion were manifested at the nomination, a circumstance which has been productive of much ill-humour among the men, and much insolence to himself, and which nothing but the utmost forbearance, and a strong sense of the duty he owed his country at this tremendous crisis, could ever have induced him to submit to. This prejudice has never abated; for, you Sir, who are so good a judge of human nature, must be sensible how extremely difficult, nay, I may say how impossible it is to eradicate a prejudice from an uninformed mind. This prejudice, whether well or ill-founded, appears to have been the cause of the irregularities the corps have been guilty of. I must here complain of C. S.'s want of candour in his letter. He has stated, that on the regulations being proposed to them, "*they threw up.*" What does this mean, but the *whole corps?* Can the most ingenious sophistry apply any other meaning to the expression? I again repeat, that *eighteen only* of 120 "threw "up." Either C. S. is ignorant of the real circumstances of the case or he is not. If the latter, what is the inference? I leave my readers to judge. Since the date of C. S.'s letter, many of the men have repented of their conduct, and have signed the regulations, and there are strong reasons for supposing that the greatest part

will follow their example, and I trust that if the necessity should unfortunately arise, they will not be found any ways inferior to their fellow countrymen in loyalty and courage. I hope, Sir, that this plain statement of facts, will remove the imputation of disaffection, which C. S. apparently, has endeavoured to throw on them; on no other ground do I endeavour to defend them; and, as to the eighteen seceders, who have so basely deserted their country in the hour of danger, I hold them up to the detestation of their country, and leave them to the contempt and to the indignation which their infamous conduct so richly deserves. — I am, Sir, yours, &c. OBSERVER.

Ewell, Feb. 7th 1804.

CORPS DIPLOMATIQUE.

SIR,—Of all the absurdities and errors which have characterised the conduct of the present administration, the neglect they have manifested in not correcting a fault of their predecessors in office, is not the least remarkable. I mean, Sir, the appointment of inefficient persons to fill the post of ministers at foreign courts, as well as adopting some mode whereby the shameless falsehoods propagated all over the Continent in disparagement of this country should be effectually met and refuted. —— Regarding the first, may it not fairly be asked, has any circumstance occurred in the politics of Europe within these late years, to render the employment of talent and genius less necessary now on our part in the diplomatic department, than in the days of Lord Chatham and Lord Chesterfield? Yet it is in every one's memory, how much importance the latter of these statesmen annexes to the education, manners, and studies of those who were destined to fill the station of ministers at foreign courts; his sentiments are fully developed in his letters to his son, and are well worthy the perusal of the present Secretary of State for the Foreign Department. But when of any attention whatever being paid to this selection, it should appear, that the above gentleman considered the office as merely a sinecure for the provisioning some favourite clerk. At a moment when intrigue and cabal is the order of the day in every foreign cabinet, when every art and falsehood is devised which wickedness can imagine, to sap and shake the foundation of Great-Britain, by destroying all confidence in her integrity and faith, we send over young gentlemen, who, at capping verses, would, perhaps, be equal to any of their opponents, to eradicate the mischief already effected against us, and by the discernment, political acquirements and elegance of manners which they possess, to effectually counteract all the machiavelian workings of a *Segur*, a *Sieyes*, or any veteran of Gallic diplomacy. —— To a court of all others the most our interest to gain a control over, we continue in office a most worthy admiral, but one who has not the smallest pretensions to the character of a courtier; to another court, where intrigue and delicate conduct are particularly requisite, we send a gentleman, who will, no doubt, give the world a very good account on his return of Greek antiquities, but who is about as much a match for Gen. Brune in the Divan, as that gentleman is to him in a translation of Persius. But it is unnecessary to particularize further, and I will say a few words on the other subject I complain of, namely, the total disregard to the opinions of the whole Continent with respect to this country in general, but more particularly her plunging Europe again into a disastrous warfare. —— Sir; Lord Hawkesbury has been told, to my knowledge, and from excellent authority, that from one end of Germany to the other, the press teems with atrocious calumnies against England, which from never being contradicted, gain implicit belief in proportion as we are belied; the conduct and views of the French are exalted up to the skies, all the evils flowing from the war are imputed to us, while the perfidious measures of France are represented as merely necessary precautions on her part, to check the overgrown power we have assumed in continental affairs; this is a fact notorious, and thus, by the means of the foreign press, we are at this moment objects of universal hatred, and I fear, contempt. Has any measure been taken to administer a counter poison? None! Is it not apparent that a few thousand pounds, judiciously expended, would create us some partisans, at least, and that gross mis-statements, should be publicly refuted, and the public mind insensibly led to think less meanly of this country, and less favourably of our insidious foe? Yet, so paltry, so wretchedly economical is Mr. Addington's system, that the same causes that induced him and his colleagues to order all the gun-cases and barrack furniture to be sold after the treaty of Amiens, still operate to prevent a recourse to the measure I propose, though these ninny-hammers might, I should have thought, have known the efficacy of it from the benefit they derive from newspaper and booksellers' good-will, owing, as they do, entirely the preservation of their present stations to it. A. W.

TO THE EDITOR.

SIR,—I cannot but admire the ingeniousness of your correspondent R B. in the last Register, in destroying a building, to raise upon its foundation a superstructure, which, doubtless to his speculating mind, appears as solid as the founders of the Property Tax hope that measure will be.—He condemns a plan founded, as he allows, upon sound financial principles, because the complete execution of it may meet resistance from "the dominion of self-interest;" and he proposes a substitute, by taxing landed and funded property, which recommends itself highly to him, from its affecting only that species of property which cannot escape taxation. If equality of burthens renders them less obnoxious, it is very desirable to attempt it; and if the selfishness of individuals makes the result imperfect, the success, in a considerable degree, ought, nevertheless, to encourage the pursuing so excellent a principle. By charging the present tax as odious and attended with difficulties, he shews no knowledge of its provisions, and were it so, his substitute would be subject to both objections in all their force:—if the disclosure of property creates the odium, he is not aware that his own scheme omits that branch of it, which is now the most secure from disclosure, by its favorable provisions for collecting the duty on profits of trade and industry; and whatever difficulties may arise, proceeds principally from the valuing that property which he offers in lieu, as the easiest source of supply. His own mode of estimating lands, &c. by survey, is borrowed from the present measure, though these are adopted only as a last resource, in case a much easier and more economical method should fail. His objection to taxing the profits of labor, evinces not only a partiality, as he himself admits, but would be checking industry in one channel to throw a preponderance into another, and seems that he imagines a tax upon lands is wholly unconnected with labor, and the profit of it—The measure now in force embraces the whole of R. B.'s suggestions, but extended to the view of equalizing the public burthens, by involving in them every individual, whose property, however derived, enjoys the protection and blessings they are the support of; and there is no doubt, but that in point of efficacy, which it cannot be denied govern ment from late experiments has the power of prejudging, every expectation will be answered.—Your's, &c. P. Q.

25th Jan. 1804.

TO THE EDITOR.

SIR,—In my last I pointed out the defect of the present establishment of the marine corps, in their not having a sufficient number of field officers. I have now to observe, that there is not proper encouragement given to the non-commissioned officers.—The serjeants in the regiments of the line, after serving a certain number of years, are not only entitled to the benefit of the Chelsea Hospital, but I believe there is about four hundred of them, who have what is called the King's Letter, which amounts to a shilling a day for life. On the other hand, the serjeants of marines, when they are admitted into Greenwich Hospital, are on the same footing as the privates, there not being any other establishment for them. In order to obtain some little indulgences that are allowed to that class of officers in the navy, commonly called petty officers, they are under the mortifying necessity, of permitting themselves to be rated on the hospital books, as boatswain's mates. What a degradation to an old soldier, who has bled in the cause of his country to reflect on, that he cannot be permitted to enjoy those comforts that his worn out constitution requires, and that his services ought to have commanded, because he has fought the battles of his country in a red coat, in the room of a blue one! I hope the present Admiralty Board will do away such illiberal distinctions, and endeavour to procure the King's Letter for a certain number of them, in proportion to the strength of the corps.—There are many serjeants now serving, who have been in the corps thirty years, and could not get admitted into Greenwich Hospital, on account of there not being any vacancies; the consequence of which was, that at the last reduction, the commanding officers of the different divisions, very much to their credit, could not think of throwing on the world, on a small pension of nine pounds a year, a deserving class of men, who had served their country faithfully and honorably for such a length of time. Had they belonged to the army, and there had been vacancies of the King's Letter List, they would have been entitled to eighteen pounds a year. These are striking and unjust distinctions, and loudly call for reformation.—The money the marine corps has paid to Greenwich from the year 1755, until the present time, must be very considerable; and it is astonishing, no alteration has been made in the regulations of that hospital, in favour of a corps, which has contributed so much

to the increase of their funds. It must either have arose from professional prejudices, or the most culpable neglect. From whatever cause it has arisen, the peculiar hardship, and injustice the corps has suffered, is the same, and must be equally disgusting to both the officers and men.—I shall for the present, Mr. Cobbett, take my leave of this subject, in hopes that the Admiralty Board will enquire into what I have stated in these letters; and I should be happy to hear, that the new code of marine instructions for the guidance of officers on board, were published. They are most anxiously looked for by the whole corps. For fear of injuring the public service, I shall forbear making any observations at the present critical moment, on the situation of the marines, when doing duty on board, but will probably resume that subject at a future opportunity.—Yours, &c.

11*th Feb.* 1804. T. S.

LORD ST. VINCENT AND THE NAVY.

Sir,——In looking over your weekly publications, in the last year, I have been a good deal struck with two letters dated the 11th Feb. and 10th April from Plymouth, signed "An Englishman," inserted in your Register of 19th March and 30th of April.——It is with truly patriotic concern, I find, that these two letters have not produced their merited effect. I do not mean to say, that the contents of an anonymous publication should be so much taken for granted, as to impress an idea that the facts it relates are founded in positive truths, merely because they have not been controverted; but, I aver that the circumstances detailed in these letters were of such a nature, as (taking into consideration also their notoriety) should have induced the minister to make a proper inquiry into the truth of the relation: and, if he had so done, he would not only have ascertained that the Englishman's representation was founded in truth, but would have discovered also much other matter, infinitely stronger than what is contained in the two letters, which ought to have opened his eyes to the danger of the country, from the mismanagement of the naval department.——As it is but too evident, that the minister has not made that enquiry; or, if he has so done, that he has not properly laid the result of it before his Majesty, I have myself taken some pains to ascertain certain facts respecting the naval department, which I shall beg leave to lay before you, in the hope that they may find their way to the Royal Eye, and meet, in the enlightened and discriminating mind of his Majesty, that consideration which he may consider them to merit.—The picture which the Englishman, in February and April last, drew of the then state of our Navy, of our Dock-yards, and of the proceedings of the Board of Admiralty, strong as it did at that time appear, is but a very faint colouring of the existing circumstances in those respects of the present day.—The symptoms of palsy, which then pervaded the Dock-yards, are now turned to the palsy itself. The same spirit in the Admiralty, which has led to that effect, still continues; but its operation proceeds with a redoubled fury. The contractors for the supply of the various stores for the navy, have, many of them, either withdrawn themselves entirely, or have required such extravagant prices for the articles of their respective supply, in order to indemnify themselves against the effects of the more than rigid mode of reception exercised by the panic struck Dock-yard officers, as to render it impossible for the Navy Board to contract with them: and, this has induced a necessity, on the part of that Board, for departing from the old and wholesome mode of supply, by fair and open competition, under which our navy has, heretofore, flourished; and of adopting either the pernicious mode of procuring the supplies by private commission, or that more than pernicious system of manufacturing the articles in our own Dock-yards: the former liable to job and imposition, the latter subject to fraud almost impossible to detect, and to enhancing the cost of the articles so obtained cent. per cent.——That the operations in the Dock-yards go on so languidly will not appear surprising, when it is known, that they are upwards of a thousand short of their complement of shipwrights and caulkers, besides other artificers and labourers, in great numbers; but what operates even still more powerfully to produce this langour, is what has been faithfully described by your old correspondent, viz. that fear on the part of the yard officers of exercising the smallest discretion, that distrust they have of each other as well as of those under them, and that systematic determination, in which they persevere, arising from an apprehension of losing their places, of executing no orders but what are defined in the clearest manner, and then not in such a way as shall be most conducive to the benefit of the service, but as shall secure them from punishment. Hence arises above all things that short supply of that very essential article

timber, so much complained of; from the deficiency of which, the most dreadful consequences are to be apprehended. I will, Sir, mention only one instance, which has lately occurred in respect of the reception of timber, and which may afford the means of judging how this business is conducted, and how the timber merchants are dealt with. It is the practice of the service, that when a contractor has a lot of timber to send into the Dock-yards, a confidential subordinate officer is sent from thence to survey it, and mark such as is fit for his Majesty's service. The contractor fearing to incur the expense of the carriage of timber which might be rejected in the Dock-yard, did, upon this occasion, most earnestly entreat this officer to mark only such as he was certain would be received. The officer assured him he would do so for his own sake. The timber he thus marked was conveyed to the Dock-yard. One-third of it only was received by the yard officers, and the other two-thirds rejected, which the contractor will have to take away at a very great expense; besides sustaining considerable loss from its having undergone, in the Dock-yards, the operation of boring and squaring, as it is called, which greatly reduces the value of it at market.—Now, Sir, I could detail to you a great many instances of the treatment of the contractors, equally vexatious with the foregoing one, all tending to prevent the necessary supply not only of this very essential article, but of many other articles of stores equally important. From these circumstances, and from the deficiency in the complement of artificers, which has existed ever since Lord St. Vincent, in his visitation, carried his *purging reform* through the Dock-yards, you will be able to judge whether it be possible to uphold our navy. But, added to this, there is the operation of several collateral causes which equally tend to the downfall of our navy, equally arising from rigour and the most mistaken policy, and false economy on the part of the Admiralty.——You have heard much of the ill-judged rapidity with which our glorious fleet was dismantled, and of the reduction which took place in the artificers of the dock-yards; whereby the repairs of our ships have been most ruinously retarded. The consequence of this has been, that we have sent many ships to sea which wanted considerable repair, and were laid by for that purpose; a measure unheard of in the annals of the Admiralty, and which might have been avoided, had not the reputation for economy, rather than the real good of his country, been the object of the noble lord's pursuit. Judge, Sir, in what state these ships will return to port, after the winter's cruize off Brest! and whether under the circumstances I have stated, it can be expected without a radical change of system, that they can ever again be brought into condition, or at least, so as to be of any use in the present contest; for in six months they must be almost shaken to pieces, as a barrel would be that was set rolling with a deficiency of hoops upon it. And, besides that, we are prevented from proceeding properly in the repairs of our ships in the Dock-yards, no measures have been taken for supplying the places of our condemned and daily perishing ships, by the means of the merchant ship-builders: not a single line of battle ship having been ordered to be built by them since the present Admiralty came into power, excepting one only within this month, which will not be completed these three years. Thus while our own navy is declining fast to ruin, the fleets of France, Holland, and Spain, are fostering in port, and are all increasing rapidly. A judgment may from this consideration be easily formed, what the comparative state of this country will be with that of our enemies at the expiration of two years from this time, and what the consequences are likely to be, if a change of system does not immediately take place; as Buonaparté is as well informed of the state of our navy and of our arsenals, and of the effect of the death-chilling hand which directs their operations, as any man at the Admiralty and other Naval Boards, and infinitely better than nine-tenths of the Houses of Lords and Commons, or of the inhabitants of the cities of London and Westminster at large.—— Were it not that I am fearful of making this letter too long for insertion in your valuable Register, I should lay before you, and I hope the public, through your means, many facts illustrative of the ill-fated policy, and ruinous proceeding of the present Board of Admiralty, as well in the military as the civil department of the navy. The opinions of the greatest naval commanders on the present system of national defence in wearing out our fleet, and tiring out the spirits of our seamen in an useless blockade of Brest: The parsimonious system which is pursued with regard to our naval hospitals, and to the surgical establishment of the fleet: insomuch, that the hospitals which ought, each of them, to have eight or ten assistant surgeons, have now only two, the consequence of which would be in case of an action at sea, that if five or six hundred men were to be brought into them, many

of the brave fellows must perish from the want of their wounds being dressed: and, insomuch with regard to the fleet, that many line of battle ships, instead of having four or five, have only two surgeons; frigates which ought to have three at least, have only one, and several sloops have been sent to sea without any surgeon at all. These would be topics I should enlarge upon. Z.

TO THE EDITOR.

Extract of the Marquis of Tweedale's Letter to Lord Milton, dated Whitehall, 21st Sept. 1745, from Mr. Home's History of the Rebellion in the year 1745, p. 309.

"That 2,000 men, and these the scum "of two or three Highland gentlemen, the "Camerons, and a few tribes of the Mac-"donalds, should be able in so short a time "to make themselves masters of the town "of Edinburgh, is an event which, had it "not happened, I should never have be-"lieved possible."

SIR,——I enclose a passage from Mr. Home's History of the Rebellion in the year 1745, that deserves the attention of the present day. It is an extract of a letter from the Marquis of Tweedale to Lord Milton in Scotland, when the administration received the intelligence of the Pretender having taken possession of the capital of that part of the island, with a few ragged half-armed Highlanders, collected in the most savage part of the mountains; it came from a ministry whose attachment to the constitution, and zeal for the service of their country has never been disputed, and who were deficient in nothing but vigour and ability. It was, probably, unconsciously that so simple and ingenuous, yet so full a confession of the ascendent of activity and enterprize over negligence and incapacity was penned; surprised from the actors themselves, it strikes more forcibly than laboured volumes composed by gazing spectators. Similar causes even in political affairs often produce similar effects; we stand on the verge of a much more momentous crisis; not the petty insurrection of a few undisciplined mountaineers, but a deluge that threatens to sweep us from the number of independent nations, should it reach our shores and burst the feeble barriers that are exposed to it, it will be little consolation to contemplate the astonishment of our ministers at the destruction they have occasioned. ——Experience speaks a forcible language. There is a part of the same book that demands the attentive perusal of the present administration *; it is the narrative of the proceedings of the Edinburgh volunteers at that time. They are, I presume, the only body of that kind that can have been called out to action for more than a century past: they were precisely the volunteers of the present establishment, they expressed the same zeal for service, the same desire to choose their own officers, the same clamour for arms, the same ardour to be led against the enemy, and the same want of subordination: the parallel happily cannot yet be carried farther, but when they were to have proceeded to action, they held consultations, they differed in opinion, they divided, they fell into confusion, they laid down their arms, and the enemy entered the city without opposition. I intended to have added some observations, but on consideration, I have postponed them; the proper time is not yet arrived, the defects of the volunteer system have not been yet sufficiently felt, to compel the nation to abandon the principles on which it has been raised, and resort to a national force founded on authority and subordination. I shall, therefore, conclude with two remarks not unsuitable to the present moment. Among the great errors in respect to that establishment, it is not one of the least, to suppose that it is under the command or influence of the landed interest; that there are some noblemen and gentlemen officers of volunteer corps every body knows, but so small a proportion that they are lost in the multitude, and have no effect on the general spirit of the mass; a vast majority of them are composed of tradesmen and inhabitants of towns, or in other words, exactly the French national guards, who, perhaps, without knowing, or even intending it, overthrew the monarchy, sapped the foundations of all government, and paved the way for all the anarchy and massacres of the French revolution.——It is now about twenty years since Ireland had nearly led the way to the French revolution from the same institution; for a considerable time the government hung by a thread, it was not without time and precaution that the volunteers were at last dissolved, and the effects are not effaced to this day.

10th Feb. 1804. CAMILLUS.

INTELLIGENCE.

FOREIGN.—Intelligence has lately been received from Constantinople, stating that fresh disturbances has broke out in Egypt,

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* See Home's History, p. 66 to p. 98.

that the Arnauts and the Arabs have united and made themselves masters of Alexandria, and that all the foreign consuls and vice-consuls, together with many of the principal inhabitants had fled and taken refuge on board the ships in the port.—It has been reported, that the Emperor of Russia, in order to continue the measures of preparation which he recently adopted, has directed an additional levy of eighty thousand men: this report, however, is not authenticated, and some other accounts from the Continent make no mention of the circumstance.—Lucien Buonaparté has arrived at Florence, where it has been for some time asserted, that he has gone for the purpose of making some overtures of particular importance to the Queen Regent of Etruria.—Decres, the French Minister of Marine, has just returned to Paris from a tour along the coast to Flushing: immediately on his arrival he had a long interview with the First Consul, who, it is said, is about to leave the capital for two or three weeks, on a journey which is not yet known.—It is said in the American papers, that Mr. Merry, the minister lately sent from Great Britain to the United States, has involved himself in a dispute with that government, in consequence of Mrs. Merry's insisting to take precedence of the ladies of the American secretaries of state, war, navy, and the treasury.

DOMESTIC.—The London Gazette of Saturday the 11th inst. contains an order in Council, annulling the late order which subjected vessels from New-York, Philadelphia, and Alexandria, to quarantine; the infectious fevers which prevailed there some time ago, having entirely subsided.—The King has been pleased to grant unto Major Gen. David Baird, his royal licence and permission to receive and wear the badge of the Ottoman Order of the Crescent, conferred on him by the Grand Signior.—It is said, that a serious misunderstanding exists between Lord Hardwicke and Lord Cathcart, and that it is of such a nature, that either the lord lieutenant or the commander in chief must leave Ireland; the cause of the disagreement has not been made public.—In the beginning of last week a man of genteel appearance was arrested at Bath, by two officers of the London police, and brought immediately to town, upon a charge of being engaged in treasonable practices.—For some days past, the King has been much indisposed, and is now extremely ill. The Prince of Wales has also been unwell at Brighton, but is now returned to Carlton House, and is nearly recovered.

MILITARY.—Accounts are said to have been received from India, of another desperate action being fought between the British and Mahratta forces in the neighbourhood of Surat, which place was, with great difficulty, prevented from falling into the hands of the enemy.—The French troops in the kingdom of Naples remain inactive, and the preparations which were said to have been making on the borders of the Adriatic, for an expedition to the Morea, have been suspended.—At Leghorn the French flag has been taken down from the forts by order of Gen. Murat, and that of the King substituted in its place; in the interior of the kingdom, however, the French still retain the command.—In consequence of a proclamation lately issued by the Batavian Minister of War to the army to be employed against England,* the officers of the garrison of Amsterdam had a meeting, at which an aid-du-camp of Gen. Dumonceau, the commander in chief, was present, when it was resolved: first, that they would all send in their resignations unless this proclamation was withdrawn; and secondly, in order to convince the world that their resignations did not proceed from the fear of any danger attending the expedition, they would, if they were thus obliged to resign, offer themselves as volunteers in the French army where no such regulation existed. These resolutions were forwarded to Gen. Dumonceau, and being communicated by him to the government at the Hague, the proclamation was withdrawn.—A copy of a regulation for the maintainance of eighteen thousand French troops in the Batavian Republic, has been sent to all the magistrates for their information, and all their demands which are not authorised by this regulation will be refused.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

BRITISH CREDITORS on the French Funds.——A paper, entitled "a short "statement of facts relative to claims of "British Creditors on the French Funds," has just been printed and circulated, preparatory, as it is thought, to some application to parliament for redress; and, it is with a view of preventing the success of any such application, with a view of preventing the people of *this country*, properly so called, from being burthened with taxes to make up for the losses of those, who chose to deposit their wealth, the fruits of English labour, in the Funds of France, that these remarks are made.

* See p. 178 of this vol.

These Creditors state, FIRST, that, previous to the French revolution, and, indeed, till the late war broke out between England and France, they became holders of French stock, the possession of property of that sort having been secured to them by the commercial treaty between England and France, concluded in the year 1786, wherein it was stipulated, that, in case of war between the two nations, that the subjects of each, residing in the dominions of the other, should be suffered to remain, during the war, on certain conditions, and, in case of their being ordered to remove, that "the "term of twelve months should be allowed "them for that purpose, in order that they "might take away their effects and pro"perty, *whether entrusted to individuals or to* "*the state.*"——SECONDLY, the Creditors state, that the French government, when the war broke out, instead of faithfully executing this part of the treaty, threw all the British subjects in France into prison, and sequestrated all their property, whereupon the British government, as a measure of retaliation, and as a security for the British Creditors in France, sequestrated all the French property in England.——THIRDLY, they state, that, Lord Hawkesbury (that "*solid* young man," that "safe politician,") did abandon their interests at the peace of Amiens; that, in direct contradiction to the principle on which Lord Grenville had proceeded at Lisle, where the property in question would, if a treaty had been concluded, have been amply secured, Lord Hawkesbury, notwithstanding a request made to him by the Creditors, during the negotiation at Amiens, neglected to make a positive stipulation in their favour, in that treaty, the consequence of which was, that, while the French Creditors in the English Funds, *immediately* received, even without applying for it, the full amount of their interest as well as their principal, the English Creditors in the French Funds received such a portion only as "the arbitrary and unjust "government of France was pleased to be"stow on them." They were, it seems, soon informed, that the treaty of Amiens had no relation to their case; that they must be content to lose the whole arrears of their interest, two-thirds of their capital, and, for the remaining third, must receive an inscription in a five per cent. stock, taken at par, though the price was then fifty per centum. So that, according to this proposition, a Creditor for 6,000 l. besides the loss of all his interest, found his capital reduced to 1,000 l. Some persons, in despair, accepted of these terms; but "their com"pliance was useless to preserve even a "wreck of their property, for they could "never obtain a farthing."——FOURTHLY, they state, that other Creditors, who did not despair of the honour and justice of the English ministry, applied to Mr. Merry, the English resident at Paris, for protection against this injustice. Mr. Merry promised to apply for instructions to his government, and to make an application to that of France for the execution of the treaty; but, if any application was made by him, the French government treated it with contempt. Finding no hope from the efforts of Mr. Merry, the Creditors assembled, in London, in September, 1802, and appointed a committee for the prosecution of their claims. This committee waited upon Lord Hawkesbury, stated their claims to him, and presented a memorial, calling for the *assistance* of their *country* against this injustice and breach of treaty. The memorial was presented about the 20th of September, but no answer was received till the 11th of January, a space of nearly four months, though Lord Hawkesbury promised an answer as soon as the opinion of his Majesty's ministers could be taken upon the subject. The result of all this was, that Lord Hawkesbury (the "*solid* young man") did not think favourably of the claim of the Creditors, but promised to write to Lord Whitworth to obtain for them such justice as they were entitled to. And here it should be observed, that, from the papers which have (thanks to Buonaparté) been published relative to the treaty of Amiens, it appears very clearly, that *the French plenipotentiary was willing to consent to a stipulation, which would have rendered the claim of the British Debtors unquestionable*; but that, from the moderation of the noble negotiator, or from that "mixture of conciliation "and firmness," which has characterized all the conduct of the "*solid* young man" in Downing Street, no such stipulation was, at last, inserted in the treaty.——FIFTHLY, they state, that, notwithstanding the opinion of Lord Hawkesbury, Lord Whitworth, upon receiving a statement of the Creditor's case, presented a vigorous remonstrance to the French government, and declared, that he would never cease, unless prohibited by his government, to demand for them the same justice which the French Creditors had received in England, and which he conceived was due to them by treaty; and, in his conference with the First Consul, on the 21st of February, 1803, as reported by himself to Lord Hawkesbury, he says, "I alleged as a cause of

" mistrust and jealousy, the impossibility of " obtaining justice, or any kind of redress, " for any of his Majesty's subjects. He " asked me in what respect. I told him, " that since the signing of the treaty, *not one* " *British claimant* had been satisfied, though " every Frenchman of that description had " been so within one month after that pe " riod." This sturdy behaviour, on the part of Lord Whitworth, promised, say the Creditors, to produce the happiest effects; for, " a proposition was soon after made by " Lord Whitworth to M. Talleyrand, and " *accepted by him*, on the part of his govern- " ment, to appoint commissioners of both " countries for the liquidation of the " claims of British Creditors; and, this " proposition was *actually lying before* " *our ministry for their approbation and ap-* " *proval*, when the war broke out!"—— Here it is absolutely impossible to refrain from observing the effect of *vigorous* measures. This is the only instance, in which any thing like vigour was shown; and the consequence was of the best kind. It is to be feared, too, that this fact, of which the public never heard before, will not tend to establish the assertions of the ministers, that nothing, on their part, would have prevented the return of war; for, in this case, we do find, that the remonstrance of Lord Whitworth instantly produced a proposition so favourable to his views in behalf of the British Creditors, that he forwarded it for the approbation of his government, having first approved of it himself.——The Creditors conclude in a sort of an apostrophe, which merits to be quoted verbatim. " After all " this," say they, " what is the relative " state of the French and English funded " Creditors? The former received, at the " peace, their whole principal and interest, " without even the trouble of applying for " it; and can, at this moment receive their " dividends, and sell their stock, as if they " were natives of this country: the latter, " after repeated applications, both to the " French and English governments, have " obtained nothing: such of them as " went to Paris to prosecute their claims, " and enforce the performance of the treaty " of Amiens (and, amongst the rest, their " accredited agent, a gentleman upwards of " 70 years of age), are detained prisoners in " France. The object of this statement is " *not to criminate any man*, but to obtain " final justice. At the beginning of last " war, the property of Frenchmen in this " country was sequestrated, for the purpose " of securing, at the peace, the restoration " of English property sequestrated in France. " Is not a debt of *three millions*, due to sub- " jects of England from the French funds " an object worthy of the attention of our " government? Is it not their duty to se- " cure those subjects from foreign oppres- " sion? Are they willing to subscribe to " that state of *comparative inferiority* on our " part, which the French are ready enough " to inculcate? Or, do they think the *honour* " *of the country* sufficiently preserved by pro- " tecting *our own shores* from violation, when " not an Englishman can set his foot upon " the Continent, without being subject to " contumely, injury, and outrage? Surely " the English creditors of France have a " right to expect from their own country, a " fuller measure of justice and protection, " at the return of peace, unless some impe- " rious necessity demands the sacrifice of " their interests, for the good of their coun- " try; and, when the interests of indivi- " duals have been sacrificed for the public " good, the generosity and justice of Great- " Britain have ever been forward to afford " the fullest indemnity."——Yes, where the interests of individuals are *sacrificed* for the *public good*, nobody will deny, that those individuals have a claim, not upon the generosity, but upon the justice of the country. But, in this case, it is denied, that any such sacrifice for *such purpose* has been made. What *good* could the public, that is to say, the people of Great-Britain and Ireland, derive from the abandonment of the private rights of these Creditors? Evidently none. If there had been any public good so obtained; if an island had been ceded to us in consequence of such abandonment; if we had thereby gained any other concession; or, if it had appeared, that peace could not have been obtained, without this sacrifice, though the peace might be a bad one, and have proved a great national curse, still one must have regarded the public as being the debtor of those individuals, at whose expense the sacrifice had been made. But, in the present instance, no advantage, or even pretended advantage, has ever accrued to the public from the circumstance of there having been no clear stipulation made in favour of these Creditors; and, therefore, no claim erected thereon can possibly stand.——If this ground be exchanged for that of *implied stipulation*; if it be asserted, as, indeed, though with not much consistency, the Creditors have asserted, that the full restoration of their property *is stipulated for*; then it will be urged, perhaps, that, if the French refuse to fulfil the part of the treaty made in favour of these creditors, the British public ought to make

them a compensation for their loss, or, to *compel* the French to fulfil the treaty. This is contrary both to the theory and practice of nations, in this respect; and, indeed, it is consonant neither to reason nor justice. If the country, in its treaties with foreign states, obtains a stipulation favourable to any class of its subjects, all that is expected of it further, is, to cause the stipulation to be fulfilled, *as far as it can so cause it to be done, consistent with its own interests*, and of this extent it always must be the sole judge. If the other contracting party be too strong to be compelled to fulfil such stipulation, or, if the compulsion would be attended with an injury, loss, or inconvenience greater than the object is worth; in a word, if all things considered, it be inexpedient to attempt to compel the refractory power to fulfil such stipulation, the attempt ought not to be made; but, because the government cannot, from whatever cause, obtain justice to its aggrieved subjects, it does by no means follow, that it is bound to provide them an indemnity for the loss which they may experience from the want of that justice. "What!" these Creditors will exclaim, "will you suf" fer us to be ruined by transactions, encou" raged and guaranteed by the government." Every *legal* transaction may be said to be encouraged and guaranteed by the government. The man who lodges his fortune in the hands of a banker makes the deposit under the encouragement and guarantee of the law, that is to say, of the government; but, if the banker makes away with the money and absconds, the ruined man never dreams of applying to the *government* for an indemnification. The government pursues the swindler; it catches him, if it can; it brings him to justice, and, if possible, makes him disgorge; but, failing in all these respects, it never makes any compensation. That the person so lodging money with a banker is actuated by motives purely private and self-ish is certain, and that he enters into the transaction with his eyes open is also certain; but, it would be difficult to give a reason, why he should be regarded as being less patriotic, or more fully aware of his risk, than one who, under the faith of a treaty, deposits his wealth in a foreign land; or, why one of these persons should have, upon the government, a claim for indemnification superior to the other.——So much for question of "*justice*;" and now let us see, what claim these Anglo-Gallic Creditors have upon the "*generosity*" of their countrymen. They tell us, that it was in pursuance of the treaty of 1786 that they entrusted their property to individuals and to the state in France; and, they add, that they have, on this account, "incurred some degree of obloquy from "persons, who, it must be supposed, were "*ignorant of the provisions of that treaty*, and "who must withdraw that censure, unless "they have the *presumption* to extend it to "the *legislature* of that time, and the *great* "*statesman* then at the head of his Majes"ty's government, who did all in their pow"er to promote the intercourse, now re"probated between the two countries." This is a mode of arguing not at all uncommon amongst persons, who look upon the rest of mankind as being, like themselves, ready to surrender their reason at the sound of a name. That *no censure* ought ever to be bestowed on transactions merely because they are *tolerated by a treaty*, is a proposition to which few just-thinking men will be found to subscribe; but, without dwelling upon this point, one may surely be permitted to ask, what very great "*presumption*" there could be in extending one's censure to the parliament of 1786 and to the "*great states*" *man*," "then at the head of his Majesty's "government?" As to the parliament, it would, perhaps, be hard to say precisely what share it had in the treaty, but by Mr. Pitt the treaty was made, and, as far as it tended to induce Englishmen to deposit their treasure and their hearts in France, so far, does Mr. Pitt merit, on account thereof, the severest censure; and, as to the persons who were so induced to make such deposits, to regard them as objects of national generosity would be to abandon all the notions and principles by which nations are kept in a state of independence. How completely the patriot passion had been extinguished, in the breasts of these creditors, may be perceived from their silence, during the negotiation at Amiens, and even after the conclusion of the treaty. They were dissatisfied with the provisions of the preliminary treaty; they requested Lord Hawkesbury to afford them protection in the definitive treaty; the definitive treaty was more dissatisfactory than the preliminary; but, still they held their tongues; not one of them complained to parliament; not one of them spoke or voted against the compact, in which their rights had been abandoned; they begged and prayed of Mr. Merry, Mr. Talleyrand, Lord Hawkesbury, and Lord Whitworth, but not one word did they say, either by way of petition or otherwise, either collectively or individually, in disapprobation of the treaty, against which they now utter such bitter complaints. No: they wanted peace, on any terms, that they might have a chance of

recovering their treasure; and, though they found no positive stipulation in their favour, "they did not despair of the *honour* and "*justice of their own country*;" or, in other words, if tears, prayers and broken hearts failed them at the foot of the Consular throne, they still relied on their influence or their address to procure, in the form of a parliamentary grant, a compensation for their loss of both principal and interest. *Now*, therefore, they set up a most melodious cry about preserving the "*ancient character* of their country;" about "a foreign despotism." They ask, whether it is not the duty of our government "to secure its subjects against foreign oppression?" Whether the people of England are ready to subscribe to that state of "*comparative inferiority*" on our part, which the French are so ready to inculcate? And, they indignantly ask, "do the ministers think the honour of the country sufficiently preserved by protecting our own shores from violation, when not an Englishman can set his foot upon the Continent, without being subject to contumely, injury, and outrage?" This is all very fine; but where were those high sentiments at the conclusion of the preliminary treaty? Where were they during the negotiation, and at the conclusion, of the definitive treaty? Then was there not one of these creditors who did not, if he said any thing at all, join in the clamour against Lord Grenville for opposing a treaty, which was said to be built upon his projet of Lisle, but which projet of Lisle they have *now* discovered to have contained an effectual protection for their property. No; let us hope that *three* millions are not to be added to the burdens of the nation for the sake of indemnifying persons, who, whatever they may be in other respects, here present themselves to the public in the character of Jew-like speculators, who have lost their money by depositing in the hands of the rival and the enemy of their country, that country to whom they have now the conscience to look for indemnification.

IRISH BANK PAPER.—Upon this subject there was a very interesting conversation, in the House of Commons, on the 13th instant, upon a motion for going into a committee on the Irish Bank Restriction Bill, between Lord Archibald Hamilton, Lord Henry Petty, Mr. Foster, Mr. Corry, Mr. Thornton, Lord Castlereagh, and others. The two former noblemen made some very pertinent observations, and discovered much information on every point upon which they touched. They agreed, with and were supported by Mr. Foster, in stating, that the bank paper in Ireland was not only depreciated, but was at an actual and positive discount of more than ten per centum. Mr. Foster stated, that there was *no silver* in Ireland, and that even the *brass* was not of the *best quality*.—Against such facts what could the ministers urge? Yet, did Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Corry say a good deal. The gentlemen, to whom they had to reply, had attributed, and very truly, the depreciation of the paper to the *increase* of that paper; and, of course, they cast the blame chiefly upon the bank of Ireland. Mr. Corry and Lord Castlereagh seemed to have hardly any other object in view than to defend the Irish Bank Directors, which, it may be observed, is the course which, on such occasions, ministers always take. But in this attempt at defence, neither of them stated any thing positively; but contented themselves with suggesting rather what *might be* than what *was* the cause of the depreciation. Very sober and grave, however, were the cautions which they threw out, with respect to the manner, in which the subject should be treated. They observed, and with perfect truth, that the currency in Ireland, "was in a very *critical way*;" the question, they said, was of "a very abstruse nature;" and that "great mischiefs might arise from awakening apprehensions upon so *delicate* a point." To do Mr. Corry justice, however, it must be observed, that he made an observation or two, which though not, perhaps, perfectly original, are, as coming from *a minister*, (God protect us!) not altogether unworthy of notice; to wit, that amongst the causes of the increase of Irish bank paper were the "*augmentation of the* "*taxes*, and the *decrease of specie*;" and, that as to the duration of the restriction, he was "not *aware* of any circumstances that would "render restriction necessary in Ireland "*after it should be taken off in England*." These ideas, as was before remarked, are not, in all likelihood, perfectly original, but they are, nevertheless, of some importance, as giving us a peep into the profundity of the Irish financiers.—Mr. Thornton's remarks were of a different cast. He thought the evil arose from too great a quantity of bank notes being in circulation; and this arose from the state of *independence* in which private banks, in Ireland, are with regard to the bank of Dublin. The great object, therefore, which he wished to obtain, was, to limit the circulation of private banks. But, another, and a more effectual remedy, which he thought might be applied, would be

make Irish bank paper *exchangeable for that of the Bank of England*, a thought which, certainly, never would have entered the mind of any one but *a Director of the Bank of England*. This gentleman hoped that the matter would very soon be brought before parliament, and he said, he had no doubt but that, upon *investigation*, an *effectual remedy* would be found out! ——What the gentleman means by an "*effectual remedy*" is uncertain; but, if he does, in good earnest, imagine, that the bank notes of Ireland can, by the virtue of acts of parliament, be recovered from their degraded state, in what hands, to what heads, is entrusted the preservation of our public credit! No; it is impossible. He never can entertain such a notion. He must perceive, that the paper, both in this country and that, is rapidly sinking, but is, without doubt, of opinion, that the fact ought to be hidden, as long as possible from the world; an opinion which, by others, is regarded as erroneous in the extreme, and which, as they think, is likely to lead a line of conduct, which, by terminating in a *sudden* shock, may produce the most fatal consequences.—By way of postscript to this topic, it seems necessary just to notice a ministerial paragraph, which is circulating through the newspapers, and in which the good people of England are informed, that, "such is the rapid increase and the *wonderful operation* of the SINKING FUND, that *a hundred millions* of the national debt have already been *redeemed*, &c. &c. &c. &c. &c."——That a newseditor should write a paragragh like this, or that such a paragraph should be sent to the press by some inferior clerk in office, one can easily conceive; but, that a *Secretary of the Treasury* should sit down and commit such words to paper, and, afterwards, upon reading them over, should be able so far to overcome that love of truth which every man possesses in a greater or less degree; that he should set deliberately to work, and persevere unto the obtaining of so complete a triumph over the better part of his nature, as to be capable of uttering such a statement into the world, utterly incredible. Ere long this "wonderful operation" shall be explained somewhat at length: the curtain shall be drawn, and the pegs and wires discovered to the view, even of those whose sight is the thickest. In the mean-time, let those, who are most nearly concerned in this "wonderful operation," ask themselves, what good purpose they can hope to answer by their financiering tricks? Do they think, that they are, by such means, deceiving the enemy? Do they think that a *sudden* disclosure of our real situation is more wise than a *gradual* disclosure, and less likely to produce mischief? Is it their opinion, that the *time* is unpropitious? Never will a time so favourable come again. To-morrow will be better than next day; and *to-day* is better than to-morrow.——As an answer to those who have been hired to calumniate me for endeavouring to destroy what they, in their confused jargon, call "public credit," as an answer to these slaves, I refer to the motto which I have chosen for the present sheet; and, I beg the reader to recollect, that Mr. Sheridan, in the debate of the 4th of August last, reproached Mr. Windham, imputed to him as a crime, the approving of the *former* conduct of a man who *now* expressed his dislike of the funding system! And, shall not I have the same liberty to express my opinions as Mr. Sheridan had to express his? *Lately*, indeed, he has expressed very few; at least publicly; but, I should be glad to know, on what he founds his pretension to an exclusive right of uttering his sentiments on any subject whatever?

MR. MERRY—Or rather, *Mrs.* Merry; for, the newspapers, both American and English, say that a misunderstanding has taken place, at the City of Washington, on account of this lady. I hope it will be found, that neither she nor her husband is in fault; but, really, it is somewhat mortifying, that we should run even the most slight risk of injury to our public interests from a cause so trifling as that whether Mrs. Merry, of whom none of us ever before heard, is, or is not, permitted to take the *pas* of Mrs. Maddison or Mrs. Gallatin. The last mentioned lady was, if I recollect right, chosen by her spouse, for the admirable accomplishment of leaping over five-barred fences, which she used to perfom with the agility of a grey-hound; but, she is the Secretary of State's wife, and, in that capacity, I should think it very wonderful if she yielded one jot of her right; for I have no doubt but that, by this time, she is a very sharp, intelligent, elegant, and haughty woman. All our squabbles, all our mishaps, with regard to America, have arisen, arise, and will arise, from a sort of willful blindness which seems, as to that country, constantly to pervade this kingdom, its government, in all its branches, inclusive. It is in vain that we read the writings of Mr. Jefferson, Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Maddison, Mr. Jay, and a hundred other lawyers and politicians; it is in vain

that we see, year after year, proofs of their consummate skill and address in negotiation; it is in vain that we ourselves fail in every combat against that skill and address; still we persevere in regarding them, and, indeed, in treating them, as a race of half-civilized barbarians. This is not the way to win a nation; particularly that nation, which, of all others upon the earth, has the highest opinion of itself. It is to be feared, that Mrs. Merry carried over with her the wrong opinions of her country: the consequence would naturally be contempt, on her part, and indignation and resentment, on the part of those towards whom that contempt was discovered —— The public will recollect, that I, who knew something of the Americans, augured no good from the appointment of Mr. Merry. I thought him an improper person for such a mission. The Americans have always sent to us one of the *first*, the *very first*, men in their country; and, they expect, I *know* they expect, or, at least, they express their claim to have a first-rate man sent them from this country. This pretension is well-founded; and, if we will obstinately persevere in disregarding it, we must take the consequences. The French, now our superiors in every thing, neglect not to be well represented in America. They do not despise, nor *appear* to despise, that country or its people. Their minister there has the means of living respectably, which ours never has. We want the money *at home*; but, we may be well assured, that one guinea expended in the maintenance of the rank, dignity, and splendour of a minister at a foreign court, is of more service to us, than ten thousand bestowed upon the venal slaves who fill the columns of the London newspapers, or upon any other of those objects the use of which is to prolong the duration of ministerial power. America is already a great *maritime* power. Every day adds and must add to that greatness. Events in the West-Indies are pushing her on to importance. In ten years her mercantile marine will *surpass* that of Great-Britain. And we have *a certain Mr. Merry* at her court! And we have a Secretary of State, who chuckles, in open parliament, at the thought of having *placed the French upon her back!* When one sees and hears these things, one can hardly believe, that the affairs of the nation are not committed to the hands of tailors and shoemakers. "Mr. Merry is a very good sort of man." With all my heart. I say nothing to the contrary. As good as you please; and, as I before said, give him as much as he can ask in the shape of money, if he has earned it; but, I say he is not a fit man to represent his Majesty in the United States of America; I say, that the Americans think themselves underrated by us, in consequence of his being sent there; I say he is not the sort of person or character that *they* like; and I repeat, that cordial friendship never will subsist between the two countries, till a scale and system, totally new, are, on our part, adopted in the office for foreign affairs.

COALITION. That a coalition has been formed between *any* of the great men of the country, for the purpose of effecting a change in the ministry, must, I think, be regarded as a most auspicious circumstance. I have always thought, and I have frequently *said*, that no such junction, no such change, would ever take place, till it was forced upon the nation by the irresistible *torrent of events*. That torrent has long been gathering; its increasing swell is now visible to almost every eye; and, the danger is, that it may overwhelm us, in the very moment, when, after a too long delay, we are, at last, preparing to resist it by the united talents, wisdom, and courage of those who, if called to our assistance at an earlier period, would have saved us without a struggle. But, apprehensions like this ought not to make us droop in despair. There is yet time. Talent and courage alone are wanted. We have all the means of safety, and of glory, in our hands. If it be true, as the newspapers state, and as I most sincerely hope, that a resolution has been taken by Mr. Fox, Mr. Windham and Lord Grenville, cordially to co-operate together for the great public purpose of composing, or *producing, somehow or other*, an enlightened and powerful administration, there is not only a hope, but there is ground for a confidence, that our deliverance from this state of feebleness and disgrace is very near at hand. If this junction has been formed, it has certainly for its motive nothing *selfish*. The object will not be *place*, but *power*; power brought to the service of the nation, and exercised, either by the persons who compose this coalition, or by those who are able to resist them as an opposition; so that, whichever way the coalition operates, it must produce a change of no inconsiderable importance; it must put the powers of the state into abler hands. On this subject of coalition, it is not improper to advert to a pamphlet, lately published by a MR. WARD, who is said to be a lawyer, and who is certainly upon terms of intimacy with Mr. Pitt; not, perhaps, of direct intercourse of sentiment, but, who, by the means of friends and relations,

comes so near him as to be supposed to know something of his wishes and intentions relative to political and party subjects. This gentleman has written a very dull solicitor-like three shilling pamphlet, with, as it would appear, no other *immediate* object than that of exculpating Mr. Pitt from the charges of inconsistency and insincerity, incurred by his conduct with regard to Mr. Patten's motion, an object in which the writer has totally failed. But, in the course of his tiresome pages, he has observed, that the opposition against Mr. Addington has hitherto failed "from the *want of concert* in "the opposing generals; the *old jealousies* of "some, and the *differing views* of others." Then, those who have had the patience to follow him to the end, will find him concluding thus: "could wishes decide there "should be *an end of party*. ALL the opposing benches in the House of Commons "present *abilities that might yet save the nation*. "Can any one refuse to say, that *Mr. Fox's* "mind is of the very first class? It is dreadful to think, that *the whole* of this ability "is excluded from the Cabinet. But men's "eyes must open at last to their real situation."——I shall not stop here to ask Mr. Ward how he can reconcile his deplorable picture of the *present* Cabinet with Mr. Pitt's eulogium upon the persons who compose it; but shall proceed to remark, that these his expressions, which I have quoted, have given rise to another pamphlet, in the form of a letter to him "recommendatory of a coalition." The author of this letter has much more talent as well as some liberal political notions and views than Mr. Ward appears to have; but, as to his opinion of the practicability of a coalition, and afterwards a ministry, of which Mr. Pitt should be the head, I am *now* afraid it is erroneous. Mr. Pitt, since the present session of Parliament, has, as far as I can perceive, discovered no disposition towards such an union. It would be presumption to pretend to *know* what he will do; but, it is not presumption in me to say, that I *think* he adheres to his former pretensions, of having all the government, or *none* of it; that, conscious of his own great powers of persuasion, and of the weight of his influence with the monied and commercial men of the country, he will stand upon his own foundation, and, gathering round him his obedient, though now scattered satellites, will again bid defiance to the aristocracy, the church, and tillers of the land. That the next stage of his ministerial career will be of *short duration* I am confident; because, the foundation will slide from beneath him; but, of this he is not, perhaps, at all apprehensive; and, therefore, there is no reason to suppose, that he will share the real powers of government with any other persons, be they whom they may. I give this opinion with regret. I have been anxious to discover grounds for hoping, that Mr. Pitt would heartily co-operate in the forming of a ministry that should embrace all the best talents of the country collected from *all* parties; but as my observation has led to a different result, it is my duty to say so to my readers.—— While, however, I express my regret at what I think will be the course of party politics pursued by Mr. Pitt, I cannot disguise, that I should see with regret infinitely greater, any union between him and the other great men of the day, unless his system of policy, foreign and domestic, were first completely and explicitly abandoned. That system, which is neither more nor less than *that of governing by the selfish and base feelings*, has sunk us to our present lamentable state, from which we never can be raised to our former greatness, without the adoption of general principles, precisely the contrary of those, upon which the affairs of our country have been conducted for twenty years past. We must again be great, or we must be nothing; and, greatness is not to be re-acquired by implicitly yielding to the councils of merchants, manufacturers, and bankers. The generous spirit of the people must once more be appealed to: men must be called upon to fight, not for their property, not for "the *stake* which they "have in the public *stock*;" but for the *honour* and *glory* of their country; for the preservation of the *name* and *fame* bequeathed them by their fathers, and which it is their duty to hand down untarnished to their children. If this motive be insufficient, all others will be unavailing: our enemy is triumphant, and we are enslaved.

THE KING.——When, in the preceding sheet, I was stating a case, in which, from the impossibility of making an immediate change in the ministry, it might be proper for the persons composing an Opposition to aid the ministers with their advice, I little imagined that such a case would so soon have existed, and still less did I apprehend, that it would arise from so melancholy, so heart-rending a cause, as that which now presents itself in the dangerous and dreadful malady, with which our beloved Sovereign is afflicted. In this state of things, it is the duty of *every* man to contribute, by all the means at his command, towards the support of those, in whose hands the powers of the

state are lodged; because, out of those hands, feeble as they are, these powers cannot instantly be taken——But, while every one will readily assent to the truth and propriety of this remark, it is to be hoped, that the ministers will not attempt, for the sake of prolonging their power, to suspend the legislative and other operations; for, in the depth of our affliction, we must not forget, that we have a throne and a country to preserve. On this subject, I am aware of the danger of misrepresentation; I am aware, that it is utterly impossible for me to utter any sentiment, however just and however cautiously conveyed, without exposing myself to the calumnious interpretations of the hirelings of the press; but, neither this, nor any other consideration shall deter me from doing what I regard to be my duty. I was born under the benignant reign of His Majesty. I regard him as the protector of my infancy, and in my youth and manhood, from the age of sixteen to the present day, I have constantly, faithfully, zealously, and *disinterestedly*, served, honoured, and obeyed him; and, though, if it should please God now to deprive us of his inestimable life, fifteen millions of people will be plunged into the deepest of sorrow, I will not believe, that one of that number will mourn more sincerely than myself. But, if this event should take place, I cannot think that we are justified in harbouring sentiments, or in holding the language of *despondency*, while there is at hand the HEIR of his rights and his virtues, whose birth gives him an undisputed claim to our allegiance, whose amiable disposition insures our affection, whose talents command our respect, and whose courage, while it inspires us with confidence, affords us a glorious example. Under such circumstances, let us not droop down like men without hope; but let us, on the contrary, call into motion, all our best faculties, and, above all things, let us neglect nothing that is likely to contribute to the safety of our country and the preservation of the honour and dignity of the throne.——Precisely what means may be necessary to be adopted, in case of an unhappy prolongation of His Majesty's malady, it is not for a private individual to suggest; but, I cannot refrain from expressing a hope, that, if His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales should be called on to exercise the Royal authority, no attempt will be made to cramp him in that exercise, to circumscribe, and of course to enfeeble his power; and thereby, to diminish, if not to cut off, the means of saving us from the danger with which we are menaced.

ANTOINE LUTZ.

"General Stuart has signified to the Officers of the Foreign Brigade, which served in Egypt, his Majesty's permission to wear the medals transmitted to them by the Grand Seignior, for their distinguished gallantry, at the battle of Alexandria, on the 21st of March, 1801.——His Majesty has also been graciously pleased to allow ANTOINE LUTZ, late of the Minorca Queen's German Regiment, at present a Serjeant in the King's German Regiment, a pension of £20 a year during life, for his courage displayed in the *capture of the Invincible Standard* from the French, upon the 21st of March 1801. The brevet was, on Wednesday last, sent off, by Messrs. Cox and Greenwood, to the head quarters of the King's German Regiment."——This paragraph I have copied from one of those London news-papers, by which, as the public will recollect, I was loaded with every species of calumny and abuse for having asserted the claim of LUTZ. Truth generally prevails in the end; but, in the interim, evil impressions are, sometimes, produced, and great injury is done to those by whom the cause of truth is espoused; and, therefore, if the result of this much-agitated, and warmly contested question should not operate as a *caution* with those, who are in the habit of abusing me, I may hope that it will so operate with the public, and that those calumniators will not, on any future occasion, easily obtain belief.

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